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WHERE IS THE SUPREME COURT HEADING IN ITS
TAKING ANALYSIS AND WHAT IMPACT WILL THIS
DIRECTION HAVE ON MUNICIPALITIES?
A Look at Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of LosAngeles
and Keystone Bituminous CoalAssociation v. Nicholas DeBenedictis*

Over 10,500 petroglyphs, or ancient Indian drawings, lie scattered
across the black edge of a volcanic escarpment on the west mesa of
Albuquerque, New Mexico.' Some property owners with land on and
surrounding the escarpment are anxious to build due to increasing pressure
for city expansion. In an effort to preserve the petroglyphs and the many
archaeological sites as a designated historic district, the City of Albuquerque [City] adopted the Northwest Mesa Escarpment Plan [Plan].
The Plan prohibits development on the escarpment face and preserves
the area immediately surrounding the escarpment area as open space. 2 It
allows private development in the nearby Impact and View Area with
building height and set-back restrictions designed to preserve the view
of the escarpment. 3 The property owners claim these restrictions prevent
full development and, in some cases, deny all use of all of their land. 4
Therefore, some property owners contend that the City must either buy
the land or pay them monetary damages because the City has taken their
land in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 5
The Fifth Amendment, also called the Taking Clause, provides that
private property cannot be taken by the government for public use without
compensating the owner of the property.6 The purpose of the Amendment
is to prevent governments from unfairly forcing individual property owners to bear the burdens of public regulation which should be borne by
the public at large. 7 Can the City lawfully require the no-build, set-back
*Sincere thanks to Bob White, land use lawyer for the City of Albuquerque, for his invaluable
guidance throughout this paper.
1. Northwest Mesa Escarpment Plan, public hearing draft as adopted by the Albuquerque City
Council I (Nov. 30, 1987)
2. Id. at vii.
3. Id. at 55-81.
4. Albuquerque Tribune, Dec. 7, 1987, at A10, col. 1.
5. Id.
6. U. S. Const. amend. V.
7. Penn. Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 US 104, 123 (1978).
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and height restrictions or should the City of Albuquerque, and therefore
Albuquerque taxpayers, have to pay the developer?
This question cannot be answered without understanding the impact
on land use planning of the United States Supreme Court's three recent
decisions in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission [Nollan],' Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. Nicholas DeBenedictis [Keystone].' and
First English EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles [FirstEnglish]."0 This paper will examine Nollan in the context
of subdivision exaction law and as the latest in a line of cases in which
the Court found a taking when the government physically invaded an
owner's land. The effect of Nollan will be analyzed in light of Keystone,
decided three months earlier, which involved a land use regulation when
the government had not allowed the continuous presence of the public
on the property owner's land. First English will be discussed in terms
of its possible effects on normal delays in land use planning, moratoria
on development, interim ordinances and other growth control measures.
Finally, the three cases will be examined together to determine their effect
on takings jurisprudence as it applies to city government land use planning.
SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS
In order to understand Nollan, some background is needed in the body
of law that has developed surrounding subdivision exactions. Exactions
are required contributions by a developer to a local government in return
for the issuance of a subdivision approval, or the granting of a special
or conditional use permit, or an amendment to a zoning map, or some
other land use approval that a municipality can require under the police
power granted by state law." The most common and least controversial
exactions are those required when a developer is asked to "dedicate"
land for internal streets, sidewalks and water and sewer lines or to pay
a fee in lieu of a land dedication."2 The government must use the money
generated by the fee to purchase lands or facilities. 3 Recently, these4
"intradevelopment" exactions have included land for parks and schools. '
8. 107 S. Ct. at 3141 (1987)
9. 107 S. Ct. at 1232 (1987)
10. 107 S. Ct. at 2378 (1987)
11. Southwest Legal Foundation, Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain § 2.02[11
at 2-4 (1986) ("Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain").
12. Id.at §2.02[I][a] at 2-4.
13. Steven Richards & Dwight Merriam, Land Dedications In Lieu of Fees and Impact Fees:
When Are They Legal? Appendix D at DI (prepared for the American Institute of Certified Planners
Seminar on Creative Financing, Washington, D.C. Feb. 9-10, 1984) ("Land Dedications").
14. See e.g., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal.App.3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685
(Ct. App. 1981); Krughoff v. Naperville, 41 IIl.App. 334, 354 N.E.2d 489(1976).
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These exactions are easily justified as a valid exercise of a city's police
power because they place the costs of necessary improvements resulting
from the new development on the shoulders of the new subdivision residents who created the need and who will benefit from the improvements. 5
With the proliferation of subdivisions, local governments began requiring developers to construct or maintain off-site improvements, such
as streets and highways which bound, cross or are located near the subdivision and to extend city water and sewer mains and storm drains.' 6
While some courts have held that requiring these off-site improvements
is legitimate, other courts have ruled the requirements unconstitutional
since these improvements also benefit people other than subdivision residents.' 7 Under either their zoning or planning power, cities can also
require "impact fees" which are levied when the building permit is issued
in the form of connection charges to a city's sewer and water systems.' 8
Impact fees are more easily applied to areas away from the development. 9
Increasing cutbacks in federal revenue sharing grant and loan programs
to state and local governments have made development exactions an
important alternative source of funding for municipal infrastructure needs.'
It is important that the amount of land or money required from a
developer be proportional and related to the need the development generates." Otherwise, the developer may be asked to contribute more than
his or her "fair share." The causal relationship between the pressures
generated by the new development and the required exaction is also
important.22 When developers challenge these exactions as unconstitutional takings, courts differ in the degree of relationship they require.
The most conservative position, held by the Illinois courts, requires that
the burden upon the subdivider be specifically and uniquely attributable
to his activity.23 A city may find it difficult to prove that the need for new
or expanded infrastructure (such as, roads, sewer systems) is solely at15. Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, § 2.02[1][a] at 2-5 (cited in note I1).
16. Id., §2.02[11[b] at 2-5.
17. See, e.g., Arrowhead Development Company v. Livingston County Road Commission, 413
Mich. 505, 322 N.W.2d 702 (1982); Divan Builders Inc. v. Planning Board of the Township of
Wayne, 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975).
18. Land Dedications at D4 (cited in note 13).
19. ld.
20. Robert H. Freilich & Stephen P. Chinn, Commentary: Finetuning the Taking Equation: Applying It To Development Exactions, Part I, Vol. 40, No. 2, Land Use Law and Zoning Digest 3
(Feb. 1988).
21. Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, § 2.02[21[a] at 2-12 (cited in note I1).
22. Id. at 2-13.
23. Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 1ll.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961). In this case the developer was required to donate acreage to build schools. Since the
schools were at capacity prior to development, the need was not specifically and uniquely attributable
to the development but to overall growth.
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tributable to a particular development.24 Most jurisdictions have adopted
a "reasonable relationship" test, which holds that the exaction will be
upheld as long as it is reasonably related to the needs created by the
development.' This test recognizes that the cumulative effects of multiple
developments often strain the infrastructure and justify the exaction. 6 A
middle ground is emerging, called the "rational nexus" test, which requires that some demonstrable benefit to the people of the subdivision
result from the exaction, and the exaction be proportional to the need
27 The majority opinion in Nollan used the words "essential
generated.
28
"
nexus.
NOLLAN v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION
James and Marilyn Nollan leased a beachfront lot, located between
two beaches, in Ventura County, California. 9 The lease contained an
option to buy conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow on
their property and to replace it with a larger structure.3" In 1982, they
applied for a development permit from the California Coastal Commission
[Commission) to replace the bungalow with a three bedroom house in
keeping with the rest of the neighborhood.' The Commission granted
the permit on the condition that the Nollans transfer an easement to allow
the public to pass across their beach. 32 The Commission's stated public
purpose goals for requiring the easement conveyance were to protect the
public's ability to see the beach from the road, to assist the public in
overcoming a perceived "psychological barrier" to using the beach created by all the private development, and to prevent beach congestion. 3
The Nollans petitioned the Superior Court in California to invalidate the
access condition as a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4 The Superior Court invalidated the condition finding that the
Commission failed to establish that the proposed new house would burden
public access to the beach. 5 On appeal, the California Court of Appeals
24. See Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, § 2.02 12][a] at 2-14 (cited in note II).
25. Freilich & Chinn, Commentary at 7 (cited in note 20). See also Ayers v. City Council of Los
Angeles, 207 P.2d 1(1949).
26. Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, §2.02121[a] at 2-14.
27. Freilich & Chinn, Commentary at 7 (cited in note 20). See also Call v. City of West Jordan,
614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 864 (Fla. App.
1976).
28. 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
29. Id. at 3143.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.at 3147.
34. Id. at 3144.
35. Id.
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reversed, holding that the Commission established it's burden, and there
was no taking since the Nollans were not deprived of all reasonable use
of their property.36 The Nollans appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a five member majority,"
Justice Scalia pointed out that if the Commission had demanded a permanent public access easement outright, he would have no doubt that the
Commission would have violated the Fifth Amendment.3" However, requiring the easement in return for a rebuilding permit would be lawful
if it, 1) substantially advanced a legitimate state interest, and 2) did not
deny a landowner economically viable use of his or her land.39 The Court
found that the Commission's public access condition failed the first part
of this test because the condition did not serve a public purpose related
to the permit requirement;' therefore, the Court determined that California must pay the Nollans for the easement. 4
The Court assumed that the Commission's stated public purposes were
valid. 2 However, Justice Scalia found no "nexus" or connection between
the effect of the Nollan's development and the requirement of the easement
because the Commission's goal of preserving lateral access along the
shoreline in front of the Nollans' home was not related to the Nollans'
actions in building a larger house.43 The nexus requirement focused on
the remoteness of the development exaction from the asserted public
purpose rather than the proportionality of the development exaction to
the needs created by the development." If the Commission had required
a height limitation, a width restriction, or even a public viewing spot,
the Court said it might have found a "reasonable relationship" between
the permit condition and California's explicitly stated goal of protecting
the public view of the beach.45
The Court rejected the Commission's contention that the access condition could be justified as part of a comprehensive program to provide
the public access along public beach areas.' The Court is sending governments a message that they must demonstrate a "close fit" between the
need for an exaction and the pressures created by new development. The
36. Id.
37. Joining in Justice Scalia's opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, White
and O'Conner.
38. 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
39. Id. at 3146.
40. Id. at 3150
41. Id.
42. Id. at 3147.
43. Id. at 3149.
44. Freilich and Chinn, Commentary at 7 (cited in note 20).
45. 107 S. Ct. at 3147-48.
46. Id. at 3150.
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fact that an exaction serves a general public need is not enough. After
Nollan, an exaction or permit condition will not be considered a taking
if a) the government could have denied the proposed use altogether without that denial being a taking, b) instead, the government chose to approve
the permit with a condition or exaction, and c) the condition or exaction
served to eliminate the adverse effects of the proposed use of the property.47 In other words, there must be an "essential nexus" between the
exaction and the burdens created by the proposed use.4" Justice Scalia
cited cases using all three tests used by state courts in determining the
degree of relationship between needs generated and exactions required:
reasonable relationship, rational nexus and specifically and uniquely attributable.49
In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted the Court's traditional standard
of review for testing a state's exercise of police power in enacting land
use regulations had been whether or not the state "could rationallyhave
decided that the measure adopted might achieve the state's objective."'
He argued that the Court took an extremely narrow view of the public
purpose goals served by the permit condition and should not have assumed
that the only burden which concerned the Commission was blockage of
the view of the beach." According to Justice Brennan, the deed restriction
on which the Nollans' permit approval was conditioned directly addressed
the threat to public access to the tidelands and even met the Court's
demand for a precise match between the condition imposed and the specific burden on access created by the Nollans."
The Court's requirement that a land use regulation substantially advance
a legitimate state goal signals an increased standard of judicial review.53
However, the extent to which the Court will increase its scrutiny remains
unclear.54 The reason the Court applied closer scrutiny in Nollan was it
suspected the Commission's motive in formulating the access condition
might be to avoid compensation, rather than to serve the stated police
power objective. " The Commission probably could have demonstrated
the proper "fit" between the public purpose goals and the easement
47. Id. at 3148.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 3149.
50. Id. at 3151.
51. Id. at 3155.
52. Id. at 3151.
53. Id. at 3147 n.3 and 3150.
54. In Equal Protection cases, the Court will review classifications by gender with an "intermediate" or heightened level of review. The government must have important objectives in order
to classify people according to sex, and the classification must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. There is nothing in Nollan, however, to suggest that the Court will use the same
level of review that it uses in gender cases when it reviews exaction cases.
55. 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
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requirement had it anticipated the more stringent standard of review.56
Why should the Court require so precise a fit? Although the Court only
mentioned it in one sentence, it found the access requirement to be a
"permanent physical occupation. "TA review of other cases in which the
Court found a physical invasion reveals the significance of this finding.
BACKGROUND ON PHYSICAL INVASION CASES
The Court has always found a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment when the government or its agents have physically expropriated or permanently occupied privately owned real property.58 In early
cases, while building dams to improve navigation, the government was
often faced with whether or not to compensate property owners for damage
to their land caused by water, earth, sand, or artificial structures. At first
the test was whether the injury was the "direct" result of the government's
action.59 Remote, incidental consequences of the government's exercise
of plenary power to improve navigation, called "consequential" damages,
were non-compensable.'
The most important factor involved in assessing the claimant's property
right was the navigability of the water bordering the claimant's land. 6
Much of the government's commerce depended upon use of navigable
waters at the turn of the century. Therefore, when the government was
exercising its paramount commerce power on navigable waters, it did not
award compensation when its activities damaged plaintiff's oyster beds,62
caused condemnation of plaintiff's equipment erected to control the current and use the water power,63 required plaintiff to remove his wharf,'
or interfered with claimant's access to a navigable part of the stream. 65
The power of the federal government to improve navigable waters in the
interest of interstate and foreign commerce "must be exercised, when
private property is taken, in subordination to the Fifth Amendment."'
If, on the other hand, the government caused flooding or other damage
while in the process of building dams to land located on non-navigable
56. Id. at 3155 n. 4.
57. Id. at 3145.
58. Loretto v. Telepropter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
59. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897) where the government interfered with
claimant's access to his land and Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904) where the govemnment's retaining wall of willow mattresses caused erosion and flooding to claimant's land.
60. See Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913).
61. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
62. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
63. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
64. Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1916).
65. United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
66. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
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rivers, streams or tributaries, it compensated the owner for the damage.67
In these cases, the government could not justify destroying an owner's
property interest in pursuit of commerce because the waters involved
were non-navigable. It was clear to the Court in these early flood cases
that the destruction to an owner's property on non-navigable waters was
a physical occupation and these cases formed the basis of the Court's
present theory of physical invasion.
Although physical occupation of an owner's land by government troops
or destruction of an owner's land located on non-navigable waters by
flooding were clear cut examples of physical occupation, over time the
Court broadened it's view of property rights by characterizing property
as a bundle of sticks." Each stick or strand represents a "right" the owner
has with respect to the property, such as the right to solely possess it, to
use it, to sell it, to enjoy it, to destroy it, or to give it away.' Using this
metaphor, the Court has stated permanent physical occupation is the most
serious invasion of an owner's property rights because "the government
does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of
property: it
70
chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand."
Physical invasion interferes with an owner's right to possess the property, to exclude others from the property and to make use of the property. 7
In United States v. Causby, the noise and glaring lights from military
aircraft which flew directly over a chicken farm, frightened the chickens
so badly they stopped laying eggs. The Court said the flights constituted
a compensable physical invasion because they permanently interfered with
the owner's enjoyment of the surface, an essential "stick" in the bundle.72
The frequency and altitude of the flights made the owner's loss as great
as if "the United States [had] entered upon the surface of the land and
taken exclusive possession of it."71

The right to exclude is another essential stick in the bundle of property
rights which is destroyed by physical invasion, according to the Court in
KaiserAetna v. UnitedStates.74 The owner of a private pond on the island
of Oahu, Hawaii, spent millions of dollars dredging a channel so that the
pond could be made into a marina. 75 The pond had been separated from
67. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay and M. Canal Co., 13 Wall 166 (1872) where the state's dam
caused permanent overflow of plaintiff's land and United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) where
frequent overflows on claimant's land resulted in depreciation of the land to one-half its former
value.
68. 458 US. at 433.
69. John E. Cribbit & Corwin W. Johnson, Property: Cases and Materials (5th Ed. 1984).
70. 458 U.S. at 435.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).

73. Id. at 261.
74. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
75. Id. at 164, 169.
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a bay and from the Pacific Ocean by a barrier beach.76 Due to the owner's
improvements which connected the pond to navigable waters of the United
States, the Corps of Engineers asserted a right to assure the public free
access to the marina.77 The Court held the government could not open
the pond to the public without exercising its eminent domain power and
compensating the developer.78 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
did not consider the importance to the public of access to the pond nor
the loss (diminution) of value to the owner's interest since the Court
found the impairment of the right to exclude constituted a physical invasion."
The right to exclusive possession, although often considered the essence
of private property, is not absolute. One year after the decision in Kaiser
Aetna, the Court denied an owner compensation even though it involved
a physical invasion. In PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins, the owner
of a shopping center already open to the public was not allowed to prohibit
students from distributing political literature." His right to exclude others
was not essential to the use or economic value of the property. 8 Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist concluded that even though there had
been a taking of a shopping center owner's right to exclude, the owner
had a lesser interest in this right because the shopping center was already
open to the public.8 2 In addition, the California state constitution's guarantee of rights of free expression and petition were important.8 3 In the
rare instances where private property which is already open to the public
is temporarily invaded, and another Constitutional right is involved, the
Court will deny compensation even when a physical invasion is involved.
The importance of physical invasion in determining compensation can
be seen most clearly in the Court's decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp." The New York legislature passed a law prohibiting a landlord from interfering with cable television installation and
from collecting more than one dollar in fees from any cable company."
The Court of Appeals found the law served the legitimate public purpose
of encouraging cable television development and had only a minimal
economic impact on landlords. 6 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that permanent physical occupations were takings per se, without regard
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82,
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 166.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 179-180.
Id.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 81.
458 U.S. at 419 (1982).
Id. at 423-24
Id. at 424-25.
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to the public interests they served. 7 The owner suffers a special kind of
injury when a stranger (the government) invades and occupies his or her
property according to the Court. This is qualitatively more severe than
when the government just regulates the use of property according to the
Court."8 Temporary physical occupations would be subjected to the multifactor balancing test used when determining regulatory takings.89 In a
stinging dissent, Justice Blackmun found the temporary/permanent distinction "misguided" and "potentially dangerous",' ° representing "an
archaic judicial response to a modern social problem." 9 He would subject
all takings claims to a multi-factor balancing test.
NOLLAN IN THE CONTEXT OF PHYSICAL INVASION
The Court's reaction to the physical intrusion in Nollan may now make
more sense. When a property owner conveys a fundamental property
right, such as the right to exclude others, to the government, the Court
will consider this grant a permanent physical invasion no different from
flooding an owner's land. The Court will apply the Loretto taking per se
rule. Unless the exaction substantially advances legitimate governmental
interests and the ends and means of the regulation have a sufficiently
"close fit," the exaction will be held unconstitutional and compensable.
However, even permanent physical occupation of private property will
not inevitably result in the finding of a taking if the government can pass
the Court's legitimate state interest and proportionality hurdles. In exaction cases, when the development condition imposed by the government
poses no threat to title or does not require continuous, permanent occupation of the owner's land, there is no rationale for the reviewing court
to resort to increased scrutiny.92
ANALYSIS OF NOLLAN'S IMPACT ON LAND USE PLANNING
Whenever the government appropriates a leasehold or other property
interest, as it does when it requires a dedication in return for issuing a
land use permit or when it requires that the landowner allow continuous,
permanent public access to the land, the possibility of a physical invasion
exists. The government will have to pay for the exaction or right of public
access unless these requirements reduce or eliminate the adverse effects
of the proposed use. The adverse effects by themselves should be sufficient
87. Id. at 426.
88. Id. at 436.
89. Id. at 434.

90. Id. at 443.
91. Id.at 455.
92. Freilich & Chinn, Commentary at 7 (cited in note 20).
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to justify denial of the permit. Since courts will apply heightened scrutiny
to the government's motive for acquiring a particular property right, the
government must have a good record demonstrating the reasonable relationship between the burdens being placed on the landowner or developer by the required exaction or condition and the public purpose goals
cited by the government as reasons for the exaction or condition. A
regulation will go too far when the government should have instituted
condemnation proceedings but did not.93
Some commentators feel that Nollan will result in higher costs for land
use regulations because state and local governments will be prevented
from adopting plans that maximize both public and private interests when
faced with a requirement for such a tight fit between the ends and means
of the regulation." Now limited in imposing conditions on building permits, local governments may prefer to deny the permit altogether.9" However, reasonable exactions with clearly documented public purpose goals
should not be affected by the more stringent nexus requirement and the
increased scrutiny requirement of Nollan. This should lead to a more
disciplined approach by land use regulators.
WEAKNESS OF THE PHYSICAL INVASION TEST:
"TECHNICALITIES OF FORM DICTATING CONSEQUENCES OF
SUBSTANCE ''96
Loretto clearly demonstrates the weakness of the physical invasion test
in modern takings analysis. The statute requiring the cable installation
was a reasonable legislative effort to insure tenants access to cable TV.
It had a negligible economic impact on the landlord. As Justice Blackmun
pointed out in his dissent, "takings" based upon physical contact do not
distinguish between significant and insignificant losses. 97
When the Court considers regulatory takings that are not deemed physical invasions, it takes into account factors such as the economic loss to
the owner and the public benefit to be gained.98 Some regulations that
preclude nearly all beneficial use of land may have a more severe impact
on the owner than others that involve only a slight physical invasion. 99
There is no good reason for giving physical invasion any special significance separate from economic loss when the latter is the landowner's
93. Id. at 8.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 Harm. L. Rev. 119, 249 (1987).
Id.
458 U.S. at 450, quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
Id. at 447.
107 S.Ct. at 1242.
458 U.S. at 447.
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real concern. " The per se rule of Loretto treats all encroachments alike
and ignores reasonable legislative determinations.' 0 ' Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: "the fact that tangible property is also visible
tends to give a rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we do
not attach to others less concretely clothed."' 2 Perhaps it is this psychological attraction to tangible property that has mesmerized the Court
into overreacting to minor threats to an owner's "bundle" of property
rights. 03
REGULATORY TAKINGS-KEYSTONE

BITUMINOUS COAL

Historical Background
In early cases, a municipality's regulations could be excessive under
its police power, particularly under its power to prohibit a nuisance, and
still be valid. "oEven when regulations caused severe losses in the value
of an owner's property, the regulations were sustained.0 5 In 1922, the
Court signaled a drastic change in its usual deference to governments in
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon [Mahon]. Mahon laid down the
landmark rule that when a regulation "goes too far" it will be a taking
under the Fifth Amendment."0 The Pennsylvania legislature had enacted
the Kohler Act to prohibit coal mining which caused the subsidence of
certain surface structures by removing the supports from under them. 7
Pennsylvania law recognizes three separate estates in land: the mineral
estate, the surface estate, and the support estate (the right of surface
support).'0" The Pennsylvania Coal Company [Company] sold the surface
rights to the Mahons, who bought a residential lot. The Company retained
the support estate and all the mineral rights. When the Company started
mining beneath their property, the Mahons sued under the Kohler Act to
prevent subsidence to their home. "0The Company said the Kohler Act
made it commercially impractical to mine the coal contained in the support
100. Corwin W. Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 559,
572 (1981).
101. John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue,
58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 465, 523 (1983).
102. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
103. Costonis, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 514 (cited in note 101).
104. See, e.g. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), where plaintiff was prohibited from
continuing his brickyard because the zoning ordinance required residential uses only and thus he
lost all use of his property; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), where the Supreme Court
upheld a Virginia statute requiring destruction, without compensation, of cedar trees infested with
a pest deadly to nearby apple orchards but harmless to the cedar trees themselves.
105. In Hadacheck the Court upheld a diminution in value from 800,000 to 60,000 (approximately
90%), 239 U.S. at 405.
106. Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
107. Id. at 412-13.
108. 107 S. Ct. at 1238.
109. Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
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estate and thus the Act deprived the Company of all its rights to that
coal. " Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, focused upon the support
estate as a separate estate and noted the loss caused by the regulation
was severe, and there was no "reciprocity of advantage" to the Coal
Company which would mitigate this loss."' In his dissent, Justice Brandeis pointed out that the state was not appropriating or making use of the
restricted property, but merely preventing the owner from using the property in a way that interfered with the rights of the public." 2 He suggested
that the value of the coal left in the ground be compared to the value of
the entire property owned by the Company," 3 a position the majority later
adopted in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (Penn
Central]."4 The majority gave no set formula for when a regulation "goes
too far". The Court has had to struggle with this lack of formula since
Mahon and is still making "ad hoc, factual inquiries" into the circumstances of each regulatory takings case. "' Reviewing each regulatory
takings case individually to see if it "goes too far" is in sharp contrast
to applying the per se rule used in physical invasion cases.
Fifty years after Mahon, in Penn Central, the Court gave more guidance
to courts on the important factors to consider when regulations are challenged. New York's Landmark Preservation Law prohibited Penn Central
Railroad [Railroad] from building a fifty story office tower above Grand
Central Terminal. New York City [City] adopted the law for the "education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the city" to protect historic
structures and neighborhoods from destruction." 6 The City believed preservation of these landmarks was also important to its tourist and business
industries. " '
Once a building was designated a "landmark," the owner was restricted
from building structures that would have an adverse impact on the architectural features of the landmark building." 8 The Railroad's Grand
Central Terminal was one of the City's most famous buildings." 9 Penn
Centraldid not contest the validity of the law's public purpose, but alleged
that as applied the law's restrictions affected a taking of it's property
requiring compensation. 20 Central to the Court's determination in sustaining the law was the fact that the law did not interfere with the present
i10, Id.at 414.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 414-15.
ld. at 417.
Id. at 419.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
107 S. Ct. at 1247.
438 U.S. at 109.
Id.

118. Id. at 112.

119. Id. at 115.
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uses of the terminal, only its potential proposed uses, and therefore the
Railroad's primary expectations were not frustrated.1'2
Unlike the Mahon Court, this Court also looked at the railroad's other
profitable land holdings to decide whether the Railroad was receiving a
reasonable return on its investment.' 22 Furthermore, the Court found it
significant that the Railroad could transfer it's development rights in air
space above Grand Central Terminal to other properties it owned." 3 The
Penn Central Court considered the owner's surface rights and the air
rights together; even though the air rights were devalued, valuable surface
rights remained.' 24 In a departure from the Mahon decision, the Court
focused on the uses permitted, not those prohibited, and the relevant
question was not what the railroad had lost, but what rights it had left.
In Penn Central, the Court identified the major factors to be considered
in a regulatory takings case analysis, which it reaffirmed in March 1987
in Keystone Bituminous Coal. The two-part test is as follows: A regulation
will not be considered a taking if it 1) substantially advances a legitimate
state interest, and 2) does not deny a landowner all economically viable
use of his or her land. 23 In deciding the economic viability factor the
Court considers a) the economic impact of the regulation on the property
owner, particularly how much the regulation interferes with investmentbacked expectations, 26 and b) the character of the government action,
whether or not it is a physical invasion or a "public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." 27
Investment-backed expectations are defined by what they are not. They
are not a denial of "the ability to exploit a property interest that [the
owner] heretofore had believed was available for development." 2 8 If the
landowner has some reasonable economic value left in the land, the
regulation will stand.'29
Keystone Bituminous Coal was decided sixty-five years after Mahon.
The Pennsylvania statute in Keystone required coal mine operators to
leave fifty percent of the coal in the ground under publicly used buildings,
cemeteries and perennial streams to prevent subsidence damage. This
Subsidence Act is very similar to the Kohler Act in Mahon. Yet the Court
distinguished Mahon by saying the Kohler Act only involved the interest
of a private homeowner. "3oWriting for the majority, Justice Stevens agreed
121.
122.
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125.
126.
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128,
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130.
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with the characterization of the Kohler Act as "special legislation enacted
for the sole benefit of the surface owners who had released their right to
support." "' Therefore, unlike the Subsidence Act, the Kohler Act was a
private benefit statute with no public safety goals to validate the state's
exercise of its police power.' 2 The Court likened the Subsidence Act to
previous valid governmental regulations enacted to abate a nuisance for
important public health and safety reasons.' 33
The Court further distinguished Keystone from Mahon by noting that
the Kohler Act made it "commercially impracticable" for the Company
to mine certain coal. In contrast, the Keystone Coal Association [Association] demonstrated no injury.' 4 Since the Association was bringing
only a facial challenge to the statute, the only question before the Court
was whether the mere enactment of the statute constituted a taking. 35
Petitioners faced
an "uphill battle in making a facial attack on the Act
' 36
as a taking.'
The Court was not influenced by Pennsylvania law which considers
the support estate a separate property interest. Instead, the Court observed
that the Subsidence Act affected less than 2 percent of the owner's total
coal. 37 The clear documentation the state presented concerning the public
welfare goals of the Subsidence Act was sufficient to prove the interest
of the state was legitimate. 3 s
ANALYSIS OF KEYSTONE'S IMPACT ON LAND USE PLANNING
In meeting challenges from land owners and developers that permanent
municipal regulations prevent putting land to its "highest and best use,"
and thus amount to a taking, land use regulators will be aided by the
focus on the developer/owner's full bundle of property rights used in
Penn Central and Keystone. Zoning regulations which are often challenged are those designating property as open space, preservation park
or greenbelt areas which preclude intensive development.' 39 This focus
on all the rights stands in sharp contrast to Nollan, where the "right to
exclude" strand in the bundle of property rights was elevated to paramount
importance. When the Court perceives governments have enacted land
use regulations to prevent harm to protect the health, safety and welfare
131. Id. at 1240.
132. Id. at 1241-42.
133. Id. at 1244-45.
134. Id. at 1241-42.
135. Id. at 1246.
136. Id. at 1247.
137. Id at 1248.
138. Id. at 1242.
139. Land Use IV, a conference sponsored by Southwest Land Use Institute in cooperation with
the Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law, American Bar Association, Mar. 24 & 25,
1988, Albuquerque, N. Mex.
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of the public, as in Keystone, the Court will give land use regulations
wide discretion. If the regulation does not involve physical invasion or
title acquisition, the Court uses a balancing test to determine whether the
benefit to the public is outweighed by the burden on the landowner."
The Court will continue to make "ad hoc, factual inquiries" organized
around three significant factors: the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
the stated investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.141
Penn Central and Keystone recognize that governments may execute
laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values particularly when the purpose of the governmental action is to prevent harm
to the public. Diminution in value alone does not constitute a taking even
when regulations drastically reduce the value of the owner's land. 4 2 As
long as some economic use of the property is left, the regulation will
stand. Keystone emphasizes the importance of keeping a good record
documenting the public purpose for the regulation. The good record in
Keystone, which clearly showed the public purpose for the regulation and
how the regulation would advance these public purposes, stands in contrast to the poor record in Nollan. The only public purpose for the permit
condition the majority could find in the record in Nollan was the purpose
of protecting the public view of the beach. 4' 3 The record was not sufficient
to show the Commission's important goal of providing public access
along the shoreline by limiting buildout. Keystone also cautions land use
planners to allow as many other beneficial uses of the property as possible
to avoid denying the developer all economically viable use of his/her
land.'"

MONEY FOR THE TEMPORARY TAKING: A LOOK AT FIRST
ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF
GLENDALE v. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
History of the Temporary Taking/Remedy Issue
Any discussion of the temporary taking issue must begin with Agins
v. City of Tiburon [Agins]. 4 In Agins, the property owners brought an
140. Freilich & Chinn, Commentary at 8 (cited in note 20).
141. LId.

142. The uncompensated losses in Hadacheck (cited in notes 104 & 105) and in Miller (cited in
note 104) are good examples of the magnitude of loss that will be sustained.
143. 107 S. Ct. at 3155 n. 4.
144. For example, uses permitted in land zoned as open space might be farming, grazing, public
or private recreation, timber production and harvesting, wildlife habitat, watershed or groundwater
recharge, public recreation and scientific or educational purposes.
145. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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inverse condemnation action " claiming that a zoning ordinance which
limited development of their five-acre parcel amounted to a taking. The
California Supreme Court held there was no taking, but even if there had
been a taking, the only remedy for a temporary regulatory taking was to
have the regulation declared invalid. 47
' The California court reasoned that
if money damages were allowed in these circumstances, the court would,
in effect, force the government to exercise its power of eminent domain. 45
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that no taking had occurred
because the ordinance, on its face, allowed the Agins to build up to five
houses on their five acres of property.'4 9 The Agins had not shown any
injury since they were making a facial challenge to the ordinance. Since
no taking was found, the Court said it was unnecessary to consider whether
California could limit the remedy available to a landowner to invalidation
of the ordinance only."0
The California invalidation remedy was again presented to the Court
in three subsequent cases, but the issue was not decided because the
controversies were not ripe. The Court said the challengers had failed to
exhaust local administrative and state judicial remedies. '' In the first of
these cases, San Diego Gas and Electric v. City of San Diego, five justices
thought the Court lacked jurisdiction because the judgment below was
not final.' 52 However, Justice Brennan discussed the merits of the issue
in a dissent. Declaring that temporary police power regulations can destroy the use and enjoyment of property just as effectively as formal
condemnation or physical invasion of the property, he stated once the
court established a taking, the government must pay just compensation
for the period beginning on the date the regulation first affected a taking
and ending when the government rescinded or amended the regulation."'
Although the opinion was a dissent, it was essentially this theory that the
Court followed in FirstEnglish.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles
The Lutheran Church [Church] owned twenty-one acres on which it
built a camp and retreat center for handicapped children called Lutherglen.
146. Because it is the landowner who is suing for compensation instead of a government instituting
formal condemnation proceedings, this cause of action is called a suit in inverse condemnation.
147. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P. 2d. 25, 32 (1979).
148. Id. at 30.
149. 447 U.S. at 262.
150. Id. at 263.
151. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommers
& Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
152. San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 9.
153. Id. at 658.
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The land was located along a river that served as a drainage channel for
a watershed area and in 1978 Lutherglen was destroyed by a flood. 54 To
limit future flood damage, Los Angeles County [County] passed a temporary flood protection ordinance prohibiting building or replacing any
structures within the previously flooded area.' The Church stated that
since it could not rebuild Lutherglen, the ordinance denied all use of the
property, and the Church sought damages. The Superior Court of California struck the provision of the complaint concerning damages as a
remedy for the uncompensated taking of all use of Lutherglen.5 6 The
California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to strike
the allegations concerning the ordinance and the Supreme Court of California denied review.'57 Since the judgment was on the pleadings alone,
neither the California trial court nor the appellate court addressed the
health and safety reasons for the County's ordinance. '
The California courts relied solely on Agins as the basis for their
decisions, accepting as true the Church's allegations in its Complaint that
a taking of all use of Lutherglen had occurred. Since the only question
before the Supreme Court was whether or not the pleadings stated a cause
of action, the remedial question was isolated for the Court's consideration.
The Court's holding is limited to the compensation claim. '
The Court made it clear that it was not deciding the taking issue, and
remanded the case to the California state courts to determine whether the
Los Angeles County temporary flood protection ordinance actually denied
all use of the property."'° In a 6 to 3 decision, the Court resolved the
issue of the invalidation remedy by reversing the California Court of
Appeals. The majority could see no difference between a temporary denial
of all use of the property and a permanent taking.' 6 ' It held that since
compensation was required for a temporary physical taking, compensation
must be paid for a temporary regulatory taking as well even if the offending regulation is ultimately invalidated or revoked. 62 Mere invalidation of the ordinance was held to be a constitutionally insufficient
remedy.163 The Court said the compensable period for a temporary taking
begins when the taking first occurs and continues until the offending
regulation is repealed.
154.
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On remand, Los Angeles County may argue that some reasonable use
of the property is still left by the ordinance. Alternatively, the County
may argue that the important public safety purpose of the ordinance will
support the substantial governmental interference and the County should
be allowed to rezone the use of the land to prevent public harm without
having to compensate the Church. If the County can convince the California
Superior Court that the ordinance does not grant the government title or
a substantial property interest in the property, and that the ordinance does
leave some reasonable use of the property to the Church, no taking will
be found.
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FIRST ENGLISH ON
LAND USE PLANNING
The majority opinion in First English stated that "normal" delays in
obtaining building permits and changing zoning ordinances were "quite
different questions."' 65 It is unclear what the Court considers a "normal
delay." Oftentimes, the planning process can take years during which
time a property owner may be denied significant use of his or her property.'"
The question remains whether unintentional delays are "abnormal" when
caused by good faith errors on the part of governments, such as a city's
failure to follow the requirements of a General Plan. Intentional bad faith
delays will, if proved, most likely be compensable. Moratoria prohibiting
development, often used by cities to control growth and preserve open
space while developing a General Plan, might also be held compensable.
The Court will look at the length of time the moratorium prohibits all
development and the purpose for its enactment. Since cities may now
have to pay for delays, some commentators feel flexible land use planning
will be curtailed.' 67 They feel cities will be cautious, less innovative, less
likely to go outside the boundaries of already tested schemes. 6 ' Since
First English provides no basis for distinguishing normal delays from
excessive ones, cities may have to increase taxes in order to compensate
developers and landowners for needed regulations which prohibit all use
of the property for a certain length of time. To be on the safe side, cities
should draft their ordinances and moratoria narrowly, with specific time
limits, and allow some fruitful use of the restricted property in each case
if possible. Cities must base their moratoria and other growth control
measures on documented health and safety reasons. Cities would be wise
to investigate what is reasonable and customary in land use planning
165.
166.
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167.
168.
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around the country to ensure that the delays they impose are in line with
what is considered to be "normal."
CONCLUSION
After Nollan and First English, it appears that the Court is willing to
reduce the flexibility of governments in favor of expanded protection of
property rights under the Takings Clause. "6When development exactions,
conditions placed on permit grants, and other planning and zoning ordinances involve the conveyance of title or involve continuous, permanent
occupation by the public, they will generally be found to be a taking of
property under the Fifth Amendment unless the requirement passes both
a "legitimacy review" and an "economic impact review." 7 ° Under the
"legitimacy analysis," the courts will ask two distinct questions: 1) whether
the purpose of the regulatory action is a "legitimate state interest," and
2) whether the means used to achieve the objective "substantially advances" the intended purpose.' Courts are directed to closely scrutinize
the government's motive behind enacting the regulation to assure that it
is not a disguised attempt to avoid compensating the landowner.' The
closeness of the causal connection between the state's interest and the
requirement being put on the property and the degree that the landowner's
development has generated the need for this requirement are crucial to
the analysis of the means used to substantially advance the government's
legitimate purpose.' Local governments will decide the degree of "fit"
under state law using either the "rational nexus", "reasonable relationship" or "specifically and uniquely attributable" tests in the area of subdivision exactions. It is clear that local governments will not be able to
charge new development for existing deficiencies such as road and sewer
"74
improvements.
If the regulatory action survives the legitimacy review, then the Court
will inquire whether or not the regulation denies an owner economically
viable use of his land. 7 Keystone indicates courts will make this inquiry
by examining the owner's property as a whole. If the conveyance passes
the legitimacy review and the economic impact analysis, it will be deemed
constitutional and non-compensable. If the conveyance fails the legitimacy and economic reviews, the government must institute an eminent
domain action and compensate the landowner.
If a regulation does not involve continuous, permanent physical oc169.
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cupation or title acquisition, Keystone tells us the Court will look at the
individual circumstances of each case and apply the multi-factor balancing
test to determine whether the benefit to the public is outweighed by the
burden on the landowner. When there is clear documentation that the
regulation is enacted to prevent a threat to the public welfare, the gov'
ernment may regulate virtually all uses of the property causing that harm. 76
Regulations to preserve open space, historic buildings, wetlands, etc. will
be strengthened if they can be related to the prevention of harm to the
public.
First English reminds developers and property owners that the federal
courts are reluctant to become involved unless the owner or developer
exhausts all available administrative remedies and a state court has ruled
against the owner.'77 Exhaustion of remedies is necessary to clearly show
the economic injury. Whether First English will have a "chilling effect"
on land use planning remains to be seen. Unfortunately, none of the three
cases provide any more information on how to determine when a regulation that does not involve a physical invasion "goes too far," and thus
requires the government to exercise its power of eminent domain.' 78
The economic plight of local governments will worsen if Nollan and
FirstEnglish result in increased compensation to property owners. Already in a financial bind from decreased federal revenue sharing, cities
will have even less money to develop and maintain transportation and
sewer systems, to establish schools and parks, and to buy open space.
Citizens around the country will be forced to choose whether to pay
higher taxes or do without some municipal services.
I began this article by talking about the Northwest Mesa Escarpment
Plan. It is unclear how Nollan, First English and Keystone will effect the
single lot owner on the escarpment whose property is in a no-build area.
The set back and height requirements, which do not deny the landowner
reasonable use of his or her property, will not likely be held by New
Mexico courts to be a taking. It is clear that developers making a facial
challenge to an ordinance will have an uphill battle. On the other hand,
city land use planners will exercise more care in the ordinances they draft
and apply and the dedications they require. Efforts of cities to meet this
increased care requirement, to acquire open space, and to preserve archeological, historical, and natural resources will cost the taxpayer. Albuquerque citizens, like citizens around the country, will soon realize if
they do not want that high rise condominium in their backyard, they will
have to pay for it!
LANE HORDER
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